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not to be abolished but controlled so that we have "(relatively) stable linguis-
tic conventions, (approximate) fulfillment of a variety of relevant historical 
conditions, and close (enough) correspondence between what the authors 
intended to say and what they actually said" (p. 145). 
The final three chapters might be thought of as applications. Chapter 8 
argues that in the light of postmodern philosophy of science, religious experi-
ence can have evidential value for theological claims. Chapter 9 argues that 
the social sciences have value presuppositions, that they require ethics as a 
higher science to adjudicate those issues, and that ethics in tum requires theol-
ogy as a higher science to adjudicate its disputes. The final chapter is devoted 
to an analysis of supervenience and the non-reducibility of ethics to biology. 
Drawing creatively on a wide variety of literatures, Murphy offers many 
challenging claims deserving careful examination and wide discussion. But 
the reader should not look for help in grasping the relation between Anglo-
American and French postmodernism. Here Murphy's massive erudition 
fails her. Too dependent on secondary sources, she too readily passes on such 
popular but insupportable claims as that deconstruction refutes itself (p. 60), 
denies reference (p. 136, 140-41), and argues for a "total indeterminacy" of 
meaning (p. 141). The latter would be the case, of course, if the onlyalterna-
tive to total determinacy were total indeterminacy, but that is just the kind of 
modernist thinking Murphy herself repudiates in favor of meaning that is 
"(relatively) stable". So on her own account it simply doesn't follow from 
French arguments against total determinacy that the authors espouse total 
indeterminacy. 
A more helpful treatment would have asked: why is Anglo-American post-
modernism so preoccupied with the question of justification and its criteria 
while French postmodernism is not? No one, I think, can challenge that fact. 
But how to explain it? Perhaps the solution is to be found in that heritage of 
modernity that is most important to each side to preserve in some postmodern 
form. Modem philosophy was about justification in large measure because it 
was about critique. Anglo-American postmodernity asks the question: how is 
justification possible after foundationalism? French postmodernism asks the 
question: how is critique possible after foundationalism? 
Critique and justification were essentially inseparable in modernity. 
Perhaps they should be for postmodemity as well. Perhaps we should not 
think with Murphy of Anglo-American postmodernity as a safer alternative 
to the French versions but, to use one of her own phrases, seek "an integrat-
ing model" (p. 81) in which the two are, well, integrated. 
Rush Rhees: On Religion and Philosophy, edited by D.Z.Phillips. 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Ppxxii and 389. Cloth $69.95 
GORDON GRAHAM, University of Aberdeen 
Rush Rhees is best known not because of his philosophical writings, but 
because of his philosophical connexions. A student and friend of 
Wittgenstein (later one of his literary executors), he became the teacher 
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and colleague of a subsequent generation of Wittgensteinians-Peter 
Winch, R. F. Holland and D. Z. Phillips notably. He published very little, 
and virtually none on his own initiative. He left, however, voluminous 
writings, and this book is an edited version of some of them. 
There can be no doubt that it represents a prodigious work of editor-
ship including, I imagine, a lot of deciphering as well as sorting, collect-
ing and arranging. For this Phillips certainly deserves credit. But does he 
also deserve thanks? This depends on whether the outcome is regarded 
of special interest and enduring value. Interestingly, Rhees himself, it 
seems, thought not. Phillips records in the Introduction that when 
pressed about publishing some of his writings, Rhees said he had "noth-
ing, absolutely nothing". In view of this remark Phillips understandably 
expresses his considerable surprise that this "nothing" should turn out to 
be 16,000 pages of script. But presumably Rhees knew full well the num-
ber of pages and meant, rather, "nothing of consequence." And it is by 
this standard, his standard, that what is published here should be judged. 
Philosophical consequence must be assessed in a context. I may have 
written much and yet have nothing new to say if someone has said it 
before me, or others have pursued the matter further. In the case of 
Rhees, I am inclined to think, both of these conditions were satisfied. He 
was a convert to Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, and a very 
good exponent of it. He was also, obviously, an inspiring teacher, partly 
because of the sheer painstaking integrity of his intellect, and its trans-
parency. But so inspiring was he, he transmitted, without residue it 
could be argued, the heart and spirit of Wittgenstein, with the result that 
those very able people who were inspired by it worked up the 
Wittgensteinian philosophical method and style to maximum effect. One 
outcome of this, however, is that between the originating genius of the 
master and the explorations of the subsequent generation, there is little 
room left for Rhees's own writings to occupy. 
Anyone reading these papers who also knows the context cannot but 
be struck by the regular recurrence of all the familiar moves and phras-
es. '"God exists' is not a statement of fact. You might say that it is not in 
the indicative mood. It is a confession--or expression of faith ... If you 
ask, 'Well, when we are talking about God, does our language not refer 
to anything?', then I should want to begin ... by emphasizing some-
thing of the special grammar of this language" (p.49). "Some of your 
trouble comes from thinking of Christianity and of belief in God as a 
kind of theory" (p.127). "Can't philosophy decide whether there is a God 
or not? If it were like that, the question would not have the importance it 
has"(p.153). " ... you ought to have referred much more to examples. 
This is the principal shortcoming all through your essay ... although 
thinking of good examples is not easy" (p. 301). For Rhees there are few 
errors or problems, but rather 'confusions' and 'puzzles'. 
We have heard all this before, many times, not least from Phillips. So 
striking is the similarity of language, that in reading the pages presented 
here, the thought 'so that's where it came from' is impossible to resist. 
Nor, I suppose, would Phillips, who himself has done much to make 
these thoughts and moves a familiar voice in philosophy of religion, 
280 Faith and Philosophy 
want us to think otherwise. But the question naturally arises: is there 
any special point in hearing it again? 
It is striking that much of what is published here is taken from 
extended letters and exchanges, and a great deal appears in the form of 
notes, incomplete sentences and non-continuous prose. This is to be 
expected if Rhees's writings are thought of as primarily comments, mus-
ings, queries and reflections. And so they ought. Close to his death 
Rhees remarked, apparently, "Discussion is my only medicine. When 
that is finished, so am Iff (p.xx). Now it seems to me that discussion and 
conversation playa vital part in philosophy. To say this, however, is to 
observe that philosophy is an activity, one involving the engagement of 
living minds and the pursuit of personal, shared, understanding. It is 
not only this, of course. Part of the point, and often the outcome, of such 
discussion and conversation is the formulation of a point of view into a 
more finished form which admits of publication and is thereby laid 
down for future generations. But not all writings, even highly consid-
ered ones, should be thought of in this way. Some, many perhaps, are 
part of the preparatory conversation, and take their point, and life one 
might say, precisely from this context. To put them in print is to freeze a 
living thing, to attribute to them a nature that they do not have and can-
not bear. On reading this volume, it is hard to resist the thought that this 
is precisely what has happened here. 
It is highly understandable that those who learnt so much from Rhees 
should want others to learn from him also. Now that he is dead, and has 
left so many pages behind, it is tempting to suppose that there is to be 
found preserved in them the thoughts, insights and stimulus that stu-
dents and other admirers found in his conversation. This, no doubt, is 
why Peter Winch, before he died, concurred (in the publishers blurb) 
with Phillips's view that the material in this volume stands "clearly head 
and shoulders above anything being written in contemporary philoso-
phy of religion". But there is a mistake here, and not one of estimation. 
Conversation is essentially an exchange. What we cannot do with this 
book is ask it questions, and yet this is what every page invites: How do 
you mean? Tell me that again? But surely ... ? Precisely this is impossi-
ble, however, because what is presented to us is not the living voice, but 
the fixed and final page. 
Usually great philosophers are contributors both to the contemporary 
conversation which constitutes the activity of philosophizing in their 
own day and to the repository of texts which constitutes its enduring 
residue for future generations. Sometimes, however, despite having 
taken little part in the conversation, they leave us with writings of great 
interest and importance. Most ordinary philosophers, by contrast, sim-
ply contribute to the conversation. More rarely the contribution of great 
philosophers, or at least specially talented ones, is simply being a voice 
in the conversation. This, I am disposed to think, is the case with Rush 
Rhees. And in case this remark is thought of as a slighting judgement, I 
should add that it is true of Socrates also. Plato, however, wrote for 
Socrates. Phillips is not here writing for Rush Rhees. He is giving us con-
versations. These cannot but be distorted, and perhaps devalued, by 
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publication. As Rush Rhees himself believed, I think. That Rhees was a 
very considerable philosopher who had an important and continuing 
influence on the subject need not be in doubt. What is in doubt is 
whether that influence can be captured, or served, by publishing his lit-
erary remains. 
